Robert L. Terrell

I have had the good fortune to live for long periods of time in Third World settings that I believe provide me important insights into the strategic military dilemma Afghanistan poses for the United States and its allies. The first, and most important, dimension of the situation that everyone needs to grasp regarding this catastrophically dangerous confrontation is the fact that critically important strategic, military factors pertinent to success favor the groups our leaders are vowing to defeat. Let me elaborate.

Revolutionaries the world over compulsively study, and in minute detail, every significant movement dedicated to rapid change that has taken place over the past couple centuries. Particular attention is devoted to the struggles waged in Russia, India, China, Cuba, South Africa and Algeria. They also consistently examine smaller, less familiar struggles waged by organizations such as the Irish Republican Army, Shining Path, the Sandanistas, Tupamaros and Mau Mau.

This list is neither balanced, nor complete. But it doesn’t need to be. The key point to be understood is that the groups the U.S. and its allies are currently confronting in Afghanistan are prepared to do serious battle. As a matter of fact, it is probably true that many of the participants have been waiting and hoping for a battle such as this for a long time. Moreover, on the basis of lessons learned, I assume they are pretty much convinced that time and strategic circumstances are on their side.

Here are some of the reasons this is the case. Until now, two kinds of settings have been identified as essential for military parity, and possible success, when fighting armies of the sort currently deployed in Afghanistan by the United States and its allies. The first is a battle arena providing wide, dense remote swaths of triple deck jungle cover of the sort that exists in Viet Nam. The second is large cities with dense populations. Baghdad’s Sadr City comes to mind.

When used properly, triple deck jungle nullifies the strategic advantage of superior air power. The U.S. Government’s use of napalm, and other herbicides, during the Viet Nam conflict was not sufficient to the task of eliminating the advantages provided by such cover. Napalm notwithstanding, the “Ho Chi Minh Trail” remained intact, and functional, at least to the extent that those who depended on it were never left without viable opportunities to effectively conduct punishing military assaults unseen from the air.

The strategic military advantages that large cities with dense populations provide for irregular armies are relatively obvious. In order to defeat such armies, opponents must dismount their armored vehicles go forth into crowded neighborhood along paths and winding lanes too narrow for motorized vehicles larger than motorcycles.  This is necessary because attacking urban targets with carpet bombing is no longer acceptable, and any nation which might be foolish enough to pursue such a massively destructive approach to war will be universally condemned.  This was not the case where Hiroshima and Nagasaki were concerned.

But we are no longer living in the kind of lawless world that existed during World War II.  Wars must be fought in accordance with legally prescribed norms, and those who significantly violate them are subject to prosecution.  Thus, those who engage in war against irregular opponents of the sort in Afghanistan are forced to resort to chasing them through neighborhoods on foot.  This is a difficult task in and of itself.  But it is complicated in setting such as Afghanistan because the people  support local forces in ways that provide them incalculable advantages. This is what Mao Zedong was referring to when he asserted that “we (his soldiers) are fish, and the people are the sea.”

The chances that Afghanistan’s common people are going to withdraw support from the “fish” among them, and support the U.S. and its allies, are slim to none. Moreover, Afghanistan’s terrain provides another strategic military advantage to the “fish.”  This is due to the fact that much of the fighting must take place in remote areas at extremely high altitudes. There are few roads in many of the areas where the most intense fighting is taking place, and those that exist are commonly mined with explosive devices.  This is due in part to the fact that the remotely detonated roadside bombs that have proven effective against the U.S. and its allies in Iraq are now being used with devastating effectiveness in Afghanistan.

Given the situation, the U.S. and its allies are being forced to rely—to a great, and probably crippling extent–on helicopters to transport troops and supplies to critically important battle stations. But helicopters are particularly unsuited to fly at high altitudes because of the thin air. Those who have been closely watching the evolving battle in Afghanistan during recent weeks are aware of the growing number of allied helicopter crashes. Official assurances that the helicopters are not being shot down by hostile forces are obviously meant to convey confidence and resolve.

That’s understandable. But the brutal truth of the matter is that however confident and determined the U.S, and its allies prove to be, Afghanistan’s high altitude battle sites will remain critically dangerous for helicopters. I am certain that the leaders of Russia’s military forces understand this. But there is little evidence that the people in Washington, D.C. who are mulling over the possibility of sending another 40,000 troops to Afghanistan possess such understanding. This is highly unfortunate. Before he makes an enormous error that will severely cripple his presidency through its conclusion, President Barack Obama needs to understand what those who he seeks to defeat already know: more troops equal more targets.

It is time for the U.S. and its allies to begin the process of radically reducing their military presence in Afghanistan. New strategies, tactics and objectives are in order. Without them, failure is pretty much certain.